学术报告： COOKING THE BOOKS OR SLEEPING AROUND? EXECUTIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE WAKE OF A SCANDAL
姜翰，PhD（2014，亚利桑那州立大学），现任亚利桑那大学艾勒商学院组织管理系助理教授。姜翰博士的研究方向主要集中于社会网络与社会资本，公司治理，战略联盟等方面，他的研究曾发表于Strategic Management Journal，Journal of Management，Entrepreneurship：Theory and Practice等顶尖学术期刊上。
Scholars have long recognized that executives are often dismissed after scandals. We extend this line of research by exploring the distinct implications of executives’ social capital for their dismissal following a scandal. Using firms’ financial fraud and executives’ personal indiscretion as examples, we highlight that the impact of social capital on dismissal in the wake of a scandal is largely determined by executives’ culpability. Based on a sample of public firms in China, our central finding is that while an executive’s social capital can help reduce the likelihood of being dismissed as a scapegoat following financial fraud, it becomes a liability for executives who engage in personal indiscretion, increasing the likelihood that firms will dismiss these compromised executives.